aircraft, UAS performance characteristics are examined. This helps to clarify in which airspace classes the different available UAS may be able to fly. This concerns the broad range of size, various configurations and different performance characteristics. Next, causal models are developed for 15 accident scenario that may result in a collision with the ground. These causal models are represented as Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs) and Fault Trees (FTs), and provide a logical structure showing how hazards and causal factors could combine to cause a collision with the ground. This approach utilizes the Causal model for Air Transport Safety (CATS) developed for the Dutch Ministry of Transport. Five specific UAS related ESDs are added to cover UAS specific hazards that do not exist in manned aircraft operation. Using the twenty ESDs, a UAS accident probability model for the risk of collision with the ground is developed.
Societal risk (to a group) and
Individual risk (to individuals at a location) are evaluated. It is therefore recommended to further extend the developed method with an accident location model and an accident consequence model, in order to assess UAS third party risk in terms of these risk metrics.
Applicability
The developed methodology supports regulators with the setting of UAS safety objectives and safety requirements. It may also be used by applicants (UAS operators and manufacturers) for identification of UAS related hazards, causal factors, and accident scenarios. This paper illustrates the method for UAS operations performed with UAS that are equivalent with manned aircraft in category CS-25. For other types of UAS, it will be necessary to investigate if the ESDs developed in this paper still apply or whether or not further adaptations are required. It also remains to be investigated if the fact that a UAS does not carry passengers could allow for a less stringent Target Level of Safety than could apply for manned aviation.
The objective of this paper is to develop and apply a safety risk analysis methodology for the risk of collision of an Unmanned Aircraft System with the ground. Such method could support regulators with the setting of UAS safety requirements. It may also be used by applicants (UAS operators and manufacturers) for identification of UAS related hazards, causal factors, and accident scenarios. The method provides insight into the probability of a UAS collision with the ground in relation with safety objectives and requirements.
To better understand the differences between manned and unmanned aircraft, UAS performance characteristics are examined. This helps to clarify in which airspace classes the different available UAS may be able to fly. This concerns the broad range of size, various configurations and different performance characteristics (maximum takeoff weight, maximum flight altitude, endurance and maximum speed).
Next, causal models are developed for each accident scenario that may result in a collision with the ground. These causal models are represented as Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs) and Fault Trees (FTs), and provide a logical structure showing how hazards and causal factors could combine to cause a collision with the ground. This approach utilizes the Causal model for Air Transport Safety (CATS) developed for the Dutch Ministry of Transport [1] . Specific UAS related ESDs are added to cover UAS specific hazards that do not exist in manned aircraft operation [12] . Using the newly developed ESDs, a UAS accident probability model is developed for determination of the frequency of occurrence of a UAS accident in relation with safety objectives and requirements.
In third party risk analyses, usually Societal risk (to a group) and Individual risk (to individuals at a location) are evaluated. It is recommended to extend the method with an accident location model and an accident consequence model, in order to assess UAS third party risk in terms of these risk metrics.
INTRODUCTION
The earliest area of usage of the unmanned aircraft systems is for military applications where these systems are used as expendable weapons or targets. Recent technological developments and increased utilization of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) have widened their application from military operations only to also civil and commercial operations. Research on UAS safety has been carried out with utilization of different approaches, focusing on the integration of UAS in non-segregated airspace [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18] . A problem area that has not yet been fully tackled -and to which this study will contribute to -is the derivation of a consistent set of safety objectives and safety requirements for the risk of collision of a UAS with the ground. One of the most significant challenges in the safety assessment of the ground collision risk of a UAS is the lack of past accident data. This creates a challenge, because it is to some extent uncertain which hazards and causes could lead to UAS accidents. A further challenge is the fact that regulations and standards for civil use of UAS are still under further development. Therefore, it is not yet possible to develop a very detailed concept of operation, and identification of the hazards and causes will -for the moment -have to stay at a relatively high level. Consequently, some general assumptions are to be made regarding the UAS itself and its operation. It is clear that it has to be shown that the current safety level does not decrease.
The objective of this paper is to develop and apply a safety assessment methodology for the risk of collision of a UAS with the ground. The method support regulators and applicants in the process for approval and certification of civil UAS use.
The next section introduces UAS and their performance characteristics. The paper continues with a description of the basic principles underlying the developed safety risk analysis methodology. This is followed by a description of the causal
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UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
An Unmanned Aircraft Systems is defined by ICAO as "an aircraft and its associated elements which are operated with no pilot on board" [7] . In order for UAS to integrate into nonsegregated airspace and at non-segregated aerodromes, there shall be a pilot responsible for the UAS operation [7] . Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that there is a remote pilot, situated at a remote pilot station (e.g. a Ground Control Station (GCS)). The Unmanned Aircraft itself is one component of the UAS, which also includes other components such as the GCS, payload, data link and data storage system and other supporting equipment. The GCS is the brain of the whole system from where the flight control orders are sent to the unmanned aircraft and where potential sensor data is analyzed. There can be more than one remote pilot in the GCS. A data link and data storage system is facilitated by a two way communication link, an uplink and a downlink, between the unmanned aircraft and the GCS.
Considering UAS applications in the non-segregated airspace, the presence of various vehicle types, configurations and sizes should be recognized. The functional categories of UAS are derived from the past and current missions of these vehicles. In the light of past and present experience; one way to congregate the functional capabilities of UAS is through the following categories: Target and decoy, reconnaissance, combat, logistics, research and development and civil and commercial. Some UAS are capable to fulfill more than one functional capability while others are designed only to fulfill one specific mission. UAS can also be classified according to their size, range, and altitude. UVS International uses the following categories [8] Figure 1 shows maximum operating altitude versus Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW) characteristics of thirteen different types of UAS and their operating airspace classes [8, 9] on the right side. Nano, micro and mini UAS are operated in uncontrolled airspace and at a relatively low altitude. CR, SR, MR, DEC and LETH UAS may fly in the airspace classes B, C, D and E. Generally, their altitude range stands between 3000m to 6300m. MALE type UAS mostly operate in airspace class A, while HALE types have the capability to operate above 18000 m in uncontrolled airspace. Although the HALE operating environment is uncontrolled airspace, they may have to pass the controlled airspaces (A, B, C, D and E) before reaching their operating altitude. Under these circumstances, these HALE UAS should also have the same safety considerations as the UAS which operate in the controlled airspace classes. Figure 2 sketches the relation between endurance and MTOW of the thirteen different UAS categories [8] . Nano and micro unmanned aerial vehicles have very low endurance times that can be measured with minutes. One can observe the increasing trend of the maximum endurance capability as the mass of the unmanned aircraft increases. UAS have a very wide range of endurance capability. While nano, mini and micro UAVs can be operated not exceeding a couple of hours, a strategic UAV can operate up to 36 hours. 
SAFETY METHODOLOGY
A generic process for the safety assessment of ATM systems usually deals with three subsequent questions [10] : How safe does the system needs to be? How safe can the system be? How safe is the implemented system? Implementation and transfer to operations is not within the scope of this paper. Therefore, in this paper the focus will be on the establishment of a Target Level of Safety (TLS), the associated Safety Objectives (SOs) and Safety Requirements (SRs) for the risk of collision of a UAS with the ground. This may subsequently be used by manufacturers and operators as guidance for implementation and transfer to UAS operations.
To determine how safe the system needs to be, Safety Objectives are specified on the basis of an overall TLS. A SO is a qualitative or quantitative statements that defines the maximum frequency or probability at which a hazard can be accepted to occur. To determine how safe the system can be, the SOs are apportioned into Safety Requirements for each of the hazards and causes underlying an event for which a SO is specified. Although the SRs may include organizational, operational, procedural, functional, performance, and interoperability requirements or environment characteristics, they are usually allocated to the system elements, i.e. specify the risk level to be achieved by the system elements.
Our proposed method follows exactly the same process, but derives the TLS, SOs, and SRs for the collision risk of UAS with the ground from the existing Causal model for Air Transport Safety (CATS) [1] , which was originally developed for commercial air transport operations. • One initiating event;
• Several end-events, which are the end state of a sequence of events, and; • One or more pivotal events (failures of so-called 'barriers') with fault trees.
Figure 4 Generic ESD with fault trees
In this paper, the initiating event is defined as the first event of the accident scenario which commences the series of events leading to collision with ground. Accident scenarios end up with collision with ground end events and accident avoidance scenarios end up with no ground collision end events.
The total probability of collision of a UAS with the ground is equal to the sum of the collision with ground probabilities of each accident scenario, which should be smaller than the TLS.
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In this paper, the safety objectives pertain to the initiating and pivotal events of the event sequence diagrams and represent the maximum allowed probability that is necessary to be met by the safety requirements. Determined Safety Requirements relate to various components of unmanned aircraft systems and they represent the maximum failure frequency that UAS components are allowed to have in order to assure that the risk of a collision with the ground does not exceed a defined TLS.
GROUND IMPACT RISK ANALYSIS
In this paper, ground impact risk represents the risk of a UAS collision with the ground. This type of risk includes UAS collision with earth, sea or other obstacles. A possible ground collision might cause damage to the aircraft, damage to the obstacles, injuries and/or fatalities. Ground impact risk analysis is performed via causal models which are developed for each accident scenario that may result in a collision with the ground.
Some assumptions have been adopted in the qualitative development phase of the Event Sequence Diagrams to maintain the general applicability of the developed methodology to a wide range of UAS. These assumptions are considered necessary as they constrain the complexity of the system or because of the limited information on available and/or currently used systems in unmanned aviation. The following general assumptions have been made: The UAS is to a large extent equivalent with manned aircraft in category Certification Specifications (CS)-25. The UAS comprises one Ground Control Station (GCS) and at least one remote pilot who are located at the GCS.
The following communications links are available: o Air-ground link between the GCS and the aerial vehicle for command and control; o Air-ground link between ATC and the aerial vehicle for traffic surveillance; o Communication link(s) between the UAS remote pilots and ATC. The UAS flight may cross multiple ATC control sectors. The UAS may carry different payloads, but is not used to transport passengers. Both night and day UAS operations are considered. The UAS uses runways for take off and approach/landing. The UAS comprises a single engine and fixed wing. The UAS has fire detection, warning and extinguishing systems onboard. The UAS is able to fly in icing conditions. The UAS is used for civil and commercial IFR operations.
In addition to the above, 3 modelling assumptions are made:
There are no dependencies between the different ESDs. Pivotal events cannot occur 'partially'; these events are described as either happening (yes) or not happening (no).
ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
Aviation accidents tend to result from a combination of many different causal factors (human errors, technical failures, environmental and management influences) in certain characteristic accident categories (loss of control, collision, fire etc), whose causes and consequences differ according to the phase of flight in which they occur (taxi, take-off, en-route etc). The CATS project approached this complexity by developing 33 separate causal models for each accident category in commercial air transport [7] . A review of the original 33 CATS scenarios has yielded fifteen relevant ESDs applicable to UAS operations. The ESDs which do not have a "collision with ground" end event are eliminated for the scope of this research. Five further UAS specific ESDs can be added to cover UAS specific hazards that do not exist in manned aircraft operation. The result is provided in Table 1 . Note that the total collision with ground probability of the whole system is equal to the sum of the collision with ground probabilities of each accident scenario. Assuming that the future UAS operation will have to be at least as safe as commercial air transport in the current manned aviation system [11] , it is possible to derive SOs for each ESD using the quantified CATS [1] . The collision with the ground end event's SOs, are used as the starting point to calculate SOs for the pivotal events, other end events and the initiating event in the event sequence diagram. Figures 5 to 24 demonstrate the ESDs with their safety objectives located at the top of the 9 Page 5 of 12 event boxes. The SOs for the end-event "ground collision" of the ESDs are indicated with red color. The pivotal events' SOs that are determined via assumptions, are indicated with a blue color. A conservative approach is followed when making assumptions for the SO of pivotal events which are dependent on the behavior of the remote pilot(s). The human error probability of remote pilot depends on many factors, including the skill level, training, and performance of critical tasks. When it is highly likely that a remote pilot will fail to regain control of the aircraft after a certain sequence of events, it is assumed he will. Hence, a failure probability of 1 is then used. It is furthermore assumed that practicable safety requirements for a remote pilot may not be more stringent than in the order of about 10 -3 probability of failure per flight. Practicable safety requirements for system failures may be as stringent as about 10 -7 failure probability per flight. Therefore, when making assumptions, the SOs of the pivotal events that are dependent on human behavior are set to the lesser stringent values, while the SOs for pivotal events that are related to system failures are set to be more stringent. This way of balancing the SOs is expected to result in a realistic set of safety objectives and safety requirements, with the highest likelihood that all requirements are practicable and achievable.
A total of 23 accident and 34 accident avoidance scenarios are represented by these 20 ESDs. Accident scenarios end up with 'collision with ground' end events and accident avoidance scenarios end up with 'no ground collision' end events. Note that the latter may, besides nonhazardous consequences such as 'UAS continues flight' or 'UAS continues landing roll', also contain hazardous consequences that are not in the scope of an end event 'UAS ground collision' (e.g. aircraft continues flight damaged). These ESDs are visualised in 20 Figures, and explained in the following pages. Note that Safety Objectives are determined for each of the events in the ESDs. The overall Target Level of Safety is equal to the sum of the SOs of the end-events "ground collision" of all the different ESDs.
The initiating event of ESD 5 occurs as a result of remote pilots' takeoff commencing while the UAS is not properly configured for takeoff. The following pivotal and end events are represented in Figure 5 respectively. Take-off configuration warning is regarded as a determinative event because of an unsuccessful one causes a ground collision.
The initiating event of ESD 6 occurs as a result of remote pilots' takeoff commencing while aircraft wing, horizontal stabilizer, tail and/or flight control surfaces are contaminated with frost, ice, slush or snow. The following series of events in the scenario are represented in order in Figure 6 .
The initiating event of ESD 7 describes the situation where the centre of gravity or weight of UAS differs from the remote pilots' expectations such that remote pilots have to take additional action to maintain control of the aircraft. This ESD only applies to takeoff. Figure 7 shows the subsequent events in the scenario. Figure 8 describes the situation where the UAS encounters an increase in tailwind or a decrease in headwind after rotation. The occurrence probability of a performance decreasing windshear is determined based on the probability data but occurrence due to wake vortex is excluded.
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Figure 8 Encountering performance decreasing windshear
The initiating event in ESD 11 describes the situation where a combustible substance onboard the UAS is burning (see Fig.  9 ). It is assumed that the UAS has fire detection and/or fire warning system which warns remote pilots who are located at the GCS and also a fire extinguishing system installed onboard that can be controlled and activated by GCS.
Figure 9 Fire on board UAS
The initiating event of ESD 12 refers to the situation where remote pilots are spatially disoriented owing to unsuccessful attitude guidance and lack of visual orientation following by lack of autopilot control. According to Figure 10 after remote pilots are spatially disoriented, the type of the end event depends on the success of remote pilots to maintain control.
The initiating event of ESD 13 describes the situation where a flight control system failure occurs. Once there is a flight control system failure, type of the end event generally depends on the remote pilots' success to maintain control (see Fig. 11 ). The initiating event of ESD 14 describes the situation where any required remote pilot is unable to perform the prescribed flight duties as a result of reduced medical fitness (medical illness or injuries). Once the remote pilots fail to maintain control due to incapacitation, the type of the end event depends on the success or failure of the auto recovery module to maintain control (see Fig. 12 ).
Figure 12 Remote pilot(s) incapacitation
The initiating event of ESD 15 describes the situation where UAS' anti ice system does not operate while it flies in severe icing conditions that might exceed the UAS' certification envelope and cause ice accretion on the outside structure of UAS. Icing of the pitot static system is not covered in this ESD. The following series of events in the scenario are represented in order in Figure 13 .
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Figure 13 Anti icing system not operating
The initiating event of ESD 16 describes the situation where any flight instrument fails to display flight data, i.e. airspeed, altitude and/or attitude. According to Figure 14 , after a flight instrument failure occurs, the type of the end event depends on the success of the remote pilots to maintain control.
Figure 14 Flight instrument failure
The initiating event in ESD 17 describes the situation where UAS encounters with severe turbulence or unfavourable weather conditions which may result in structure overstress. The following events of the scenario are represented in Figure  15 with their consequences.
Figure 15 UAS encounters adverse weather
The initiating event in ESD 18 describes the situation of a significant thrust loss from the propulsion system. For the purpose of this ESD, only engine failures during climb, enroute or approach phases are considered and engine detachment cases are included. Engine fires are excluded due to their previous incorporation in ESD 11 . Following series of events in the scenario are represented in order in Figure 16 . Figure 16 Single engine failure Figure 17 shows ESD 19. The initiating event in ESD 19 describes the situation where one or more of the flight parameters are set out incorrectly by the remote pilots that result in an unstable approach. Initiation and execution of a missed approach is done to achieve a flight in safe conditions in a safe state.
Figure 17 Unstable approach
The initiating event of ESD 21 describes the situation where the centre of gravity or weight of UAS differs from the remote pilots' expectations such that remote pilots have to take additional action to maintain control of the aircraft. This ESD only applies to the approach and landing phase. Figure 18 shows the subsequent events in the scenario.
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Figure 18 Weight/balance outside limit (approach/landing)
The initiating event of ESD 18 describes the situation where UAS encounters the wake vortex of a preceding aircraft such that noticeable deviations from the UAS' initially intended flight path or attitude occur. Figure 19 shows the following events in the scenario. 
Figure 21 UAS data link failure
The initiating event of ESD 42 describes the situation where GCS encounters severe conditions such as fire and/or weather related disasters, i.e. flood, thunderstorms unexpectedly. Figure 22 represents the following series of events in the scenario.
Figure 22 Unnatural conditions in the UAS GCS
The initiating event of ESD 43 represents a mid air collision where the flight trajectory of a UAS intersects with the flight trajectory of a manned aircraft. The pivotal event "parts of the aircrafts fall down" is defined as the situation where UAS manages to continue flight after a mid air collision but the collision causes detachment of some aircraft parts which lead to a ground collision when they fall down (see Fig. 23 ).
The accident scenario of ESD 44 is represented in Figure 24 and it only deals with the situation where a part of UAS falls down while it is flying due to maintenance and/or design failure, maneuver outside the flight envelope, severe turbulence conditions or cargo fall. 
SAFETY OBJECTIVES
The SO calculations are initiated with the presence of a TLS. Calculations are carried out from the right side of each ESD to the left side (starting from the end events). A SO is obtained for all of the initiating and pivotal events that might lead to a ground collision, using the assumption that the future UAS operation will have to be at least as safe as commercial air transport in the current manned aviation system. The Safety Objectives, which are represented by the initiating and pivotal events of the ESDs, are determined and summarized in Table  2 . Since some events are repeated several times with different SOs in different ESDs (i.e. remote pilots fail to maintain control) their most stringent SO values are listed only. 
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
Safety requirements are determined via the utilization of fault trees that are generated under the initiating and pivotal events. A fault tree structure has one top gate at the top and several root causes at the bottom. The top gate of a fault tree is either the pivotal event or the initiating event of an ESD. The root causes are usually human related, system related or task related. In the scope of this research, the failure frequency of a root cause in a fault tree represents the safety requirement which is defined as the maximum allowable failure frequency that a specific system, task or human act needs to have. Human related safety requirements usually pertain to erroneous operator acts or the remote pilot incapability and restrict them to a certain failure rate per certain flight hours. Human related safety requirements are usually less stringent than system related safety requirements. The latter are usually related to system incapacities, failures or system shutdowns. Task related safety requirements mostly relate to erroneous, unperformed or insufficient task-based acts, which may include the contribution of an operator and/or a system.
Determination of the SRs can be considered beneficial for manufacturers and rule making authorities. SRs are "serving tools" for the manufacturers since they represent the maximum allowable failure frequency that a specific system needs to have. A relatively high value of SRs stands for a less restrictive safety standard and a small value of SRs stands for a relatively more restrictive safety standard. Under the circumstances where there is lack of regulations, SRs establishment would also provide insight to the rule making authorities via demonstrating which kind of tasks and/or systems have a high failure frequency under the predefined conditions. Lastly, SRs may determine the kind and level of training that a UAS remote pilot needs to receive.
An example of how to interfere Safety Requirements for root causes is provided in Figure 25 and Table 3 below. The example reflects the root causes for pivotal event 'UAS weight and balance outside limits (take off)'. It is outside scope of this paper to include all FTs (note that reference 12 does provide the full details on the derivation of about 140 SRs). Locating the GCS at a safe place i.e. a location where the earthquake frequency and severity is low enough, could help to cope with the effects of unexpected conditions and/or natural disasters happening at the location of GCS. Multiple flight planning could be another risk mitigation measurement which would affect the ESDs 'Unstable Approach', 'UAS Engine Failure', and 'Remote Pilots Spatially Disoriented'. Evaluation of the impact of the above risk mitigations on the risk of a ground collision would be a topic for further study.
SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS
Although UAS are mainly used in segregated airspace, the integration of UAS in non-segregated airspace is coming closer. To better understand the differences between manned and unmanned aircraft, UAS performance characteristics are examined. This helps to clarify in which airspace classes the different available UAS may be able to fly. This concerns the broad range of size, various configurations and different performance characteristics (maximum takeoff weight, maximum flight altitude, endurance and maximum speed).
A safety risk analysis methodology for the risk of collision of an Unmanned Aircraft System with the ground has been developed. Causal models are developed for each accident scenario that may result in a collision with the ground. These causal models provide a logical structure, showing how hazards and causal factors could combine to cause a collision with the ground. This approach utilizes the CATS developed for the Dutch Ministry of Transport [1] . The method has been applied to derive Safety Objectives for hazardous events that may lead to a collision with the ground, under the assumption that the level of safety should be equivalent to that of current commercial air traffic operations. The method has been applied to derive Safety Objectives for hazardous events related to commercial UAS operations, performed with a UAS that is equivalent with manned aircraft in category CS-25. The Safety Objectives may be apportioned further (in a subsequent study) into Safety Requirements for each of the root causes, failures and causal factors underlying an accident scenario.
The method provides insight into the probability of a UAS collision with the ground in relation with safety objectives.
The developed methodology supports regulators with the setting of UAS safety objectives and safety requirements. It may also be used by applicants (UAS operators and manufacturers) for identification of UAS related hazards, causal factors, and accident scenarios. This paper illustrates the method for commercial UAS operations performed with UAS that are to a large extent equivalent with manned aircraft in category CS-25. For other UAS types, it will be necessary to investigate if the ESDs developed in this paper still apply or whether further adaptations are required. It also remains to be investigated if the fact that a UAS does not carry passengers could allow for a less stringent TLS than for manned aviation.
